Many philosophers believe that connectionism is incompatible with folk psychology, and hence that the success of connectionism would support eliminativist conclusions about propositional attitudes. Some philosophers actually argue that (certain brands of) connectionism has such eliminativist implications. In this paper we examine two such arguments, due to Ramsey, Stich, and Garon (1990; hereafter, RSG). Their principal argument centers around a feature of the propositional attitudes they call functional discreteness. RSG's second argument centers on the question whether the predicates of common sense psychology are projectable.
The Functional Discreteness Argument.
RSG's main argument is that common sense psychology has commitments that are not satisfied by an important class of connectionist models. Thus, if the correct models of human cognition lie within that class, common sense psychology will be shown to be seriously in error.
In this Section we lay out RSG's argument in four steps: the commitment of common sense psychology to functional discreteness, a class of connectionist models that are held to lack functional discreteness, an example of a model from that class, and the explicit argument that such models lack functional discreteness. In Section 2 we look at common sense functional discreteness in more detail. We argue that common sense is committed only to certain paradigm cases of functional discreteness, and that connectionist models of the class RSG identify do exhibit discreteness of that kind. We also point out that connectionist models in this class can exhibit other kinds of functional discreteness which com-128 / Terence Horgan and John Tienson mon sense recognizes as possible, but to which it is not committed.
A Commitment of Common Sense Psychology.
RSG base their main argument on three commitments of common sense psychology concerning propositional attitudes: propositional attitudes are semantically interpretable; they have a causal role; and they are functionally discrete. RSG call this cluster of features propositional modularity (504). The first two are familiar. Propositional attitudes are the sorts of things that can be true or false, satisfied or unsatisfied, and the like; in the current term of art, they have content. And propositional attitudes influence behavior, belief fixation, etc. in ways that are appropriate to their content. To say that propositional attitudes are functionally discrete is to say that they can have effects singly (or in contentbased structures, as when a conclusion is drawn from two premises, with no other propositions playing a role). RSG hold that distributed connectionist models do not satisfy the common sense demand for functionally discrete states because in such models all information is encoded holistically-hence inseparablythroughout the network.
They mention two different ways in which common sense propositional attitudes are functionally discrete. First, they can be acquired or lost individually (nearly enough). For example, "Henry...had completely forgotten that the car keys were hidden in the refrigerator," (504-5) although he had forgotten nothing else. And if you are told that the keys are in the refrigerator, you will acquire a small cluster of new beliefs, but most of your beliefs will be not be altered.
The second kind of functional discreteness is more important in the argument. Sometimes a person has a total set of beliefs and desires that provide more than one reason for performing an action, A. And sometimes it happens that the person does A for one of those reasons, with the other possible reason not figuring in the etiology of the action at all. Likewise, sometimes a person has several sets of beliefs that could lead her to infer a particular new belief, p, and she infers p from one of those sets, with the others not figuring in her thinking at all. Thus, according to common sense psychology, it is a determinate question which potential reasons for an action or change in belief were the actual or operative reasons.
According to common sense psychology, then, the same state is semantically evaluable and has a content-appropriate, functionally discrete, causal role. Such states have what RSG call propositional modularity. Functional discreteness is the feature on which the argument turns. Since semantic evaluability and some kind of causal role are taken for granted for the most part, we will usually speak of functional discreteness, reserving 'propositional modularity' for contexts in which semantic evaluability (or causal role) might be an issue.
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RSG claim that distributed connectionism must deny propositional modularity. They characterize a class of connectionist models, which, they claim, are incompatible with propositional modularity, in particular with functional discreteness of semantically evaluable states. The models in this class are characterized by three properties:
i. Their encoding of information in the connection weights and in the biases on units is highly distributed rather than localist. ii. Individual hidden units in the network have no comfortable symbolic interpretation; they are subsymbolic.... iii. The models are intended as cognitive, not merely as implementations of cognitive models. (p. 508)
Features (i) and (ii) are meant to insure that it is not possible to associate specific information with particular local parts of the model. Connections and nodes are not to be semantically evaluable individually or in small sets. Information in the model is encoded holistically throughout the network or throughout large portions of the network. Furthermore, each node contributes to representing many different propositions, and each connection weight contributes to storing many different propositions. Thus, information is contained in the network holistically and globally, not locally. And this means, RSG argue, that all of the information in the network is involved in all of its processing, so that it is not possible to single out certain bits of information as operative-and others as inoperative-in a token process, as folk psychology requires. As RSG note, feature (iii) is not about the network as such, but about how it is to be interpreted. The idea is that the model is supposed to tell us something about how the mind works, not how it might be embodied. Consider, for instance, a classical parser-a classical computer program which is meant to take natural language sentences as input and yield structural descriptions of the input sentences as output. Such a program can be considered a hypothesis about the cognitive processes, knowledge structures, and so forth, involved in recognizing the grammatical structure of sentences. The program can be run on many different computers, with different machine languages; the hypothesis about cognition is the same in each case. The machine language of the computer that the program happens to be running on is irrelevant to the cognitive story the program proposes.
One could attempt to use a connectionist network to implement the operation of such a classical program. This would be to attempt to use the network as an implementation of the classical model-as an alternative, unorthodox kind of machine language. There would still be no difference in the hypotheses put forward about cognition. This is the kind of construal of connectionist models that (iii) rules out.
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But a connectionist model-for instance, a parsing model such as Berg (1992) -can also be construed as offering an alternative story about the cognitive processes involved in recognizing the grammatical structure of sentences, a story that is in competition with the classical model. This would be to construe the model as a cognitive model, as required by (iii). When understood in this way, RSG hold, distributed connectionist models are incompatible with the propositional modularity of folk-psychological states.
An Example.
RSG describe a simple three-layered, feedforward connectionist network, which they describe as "a connectionist model of memory." The network, called Network A, has sixteen input nodes, one output node, and a hidden layer of four nodes. Eight input nodes are used to encode the subject of the proposition, eight to encode the predicate.
Network A was trained up so that its output node is on (> .9) when the input proposition is true, and off (< .1) when the input proposition is false. Thus, the network has memorized the answers to a true/false test. The network is capable of generalizing; it responded correctly to encodings of 'cats have legs' and 'Cats have scales,' which were not in the training set.
The Argument

RSG observe that
[t]he information encoded in Network A is stored holistically and distributed throughout the network. Whenever information is extracted from Network A, by giving it an input string and seeing whether it computes a high or a low value for the output unit, many connection strengths, many biases and many hidden units play a role in the computation. And any particular weight or unit or bias will help encode information about many different propositions. (513) This is certainly a correct description of the workings of the network. Whenever the truth or falsehood of a proposition (i.e., high or low output node activation) is computed from an input proposition, all of the hidden units and many of the weights are involved in the computation. RSG argue that this holistic computation is incompatible (they say, "radically incongruent") "with the propoConnectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology / 131 sitional modularity of common sense psychology."
For as we saw in Section 3, common sense psychology seems to presuppose that there is generally [sic] some answer to the question of whether a particular belief or memory played a causal role in a specific cognitive episode. But if belief and memory are subserved by a connectionist network like ours, such questions seem to have no clear meaning. (513) 2. Critique of the Functional Discreteness Argument.
The overall structure of our critique is as follows. We distinguish three different ways that intentional mental properties (state-types) can be possessed by a cognitive system (section 2.1). On the basis of this tripartite distinction we distinguish several different possible forms of functional discreteness; we then argue that common sense psychology is committed to only one of these forms of functional discreteness, and that common sense psychology leaves it an open empirical question whether or not any of the other forms are manifested by propositional attitudes in humans (section 2.2). With this discussion as background, we press three separate replies to RSG's argument.
First, connectionist models, including RSG's Network A, typically exhibit the only kind of functional discreteness to which common sense psychology is committed. Thus, even if connectionism does preclude some or all of the other kinds, this fact would not generate an incompatibility with common sense psychology; rather, it would mean that connectionism answers in the negative certain empirical questions about functional discreteness that common sense psychology itself leaves open (section 2.3).
Second, even if common sense psychology were committed to those other kinds of functional discreteness, and even if human cognition failed to exhibit them, these facts would only show that common sense psychology is somewhat mistaken about propositional attitudes; they would not show that propositional attitudes don't exist (section 2.4).
Third, we argue that connectionism does not really preclude any of the other kinds of functional discreteness anyway. In principle, any or all of them could be manifested in a connectionist system in which information is embodied holistically and distributedly in weights and in activation patterns across nodes. Such functional discreteness normally would not involve distinct physical components of the network's causal evolution; instead it would be discernible only at a more abstract, mathematical, level of description in which the network is characterized as a high-dimensional "dynamical system" (section 2.5). Second, a person can possess the intentional state-type dispositionally. This means, at least roughly, that the cognitive system is disposed to generate a token of that type under appropriate circumstances, a token which will then have suitably content-appropriate effects on the system's cognitive processing and behavior. In connectionist models, dispositional intentional state-types thus are a matter of a network's (weights being set to produce a) tendency to generate occurrent representations under appropriate circumstances.
Psychological
Third, a person can possess intentional content morphologically (as we will put it). Morphological possession of intentional content M is a matter of the cognitive system's being disposed, by virtue of its persisting structure rather than by virtue of any occurrent states that are tokens of M, to undergo state transitions that are systematically appropriate to content M-and to do so, at least much of the time, without generating a token of M during the process. Morphological content differs from occurrent representational content (e.g., occurrent belief) because it involves the cognitive system's persisting structure, rather than occurrent tokening of M. Morphological content differs from dispositional representational content (e.g., dispositional belief) as standardly understood (and as characterized in the preceding paragraph) because the relevant dispositions associated with morphological content involve tendencies other than the tendency to generate token representations with that content.
Consider, for example, a cognitive system which treats all members of a certain class, R, of representations similarly. It tends to make the same kinds of inferences from representations in R. When it acquires a new representation in the way it acquired the members of R, it tends to make the same kinds of inferences with that new representation. But it has other representations from which it does not make similar inferences. The system thus treats members of R as representations of the same type; in effect, it treats the kinds represented by the members of R as species of the same genus. But the system may have no representation for the genus itself. Thus, the system cannot represent the fact that (the kinds represented by) two members of R are species of the same genus, though it treats them as such. (We can say R is a class of representations; the system cannot.) This is the kind of thing that would count as (in this case purely) morphological content.
In connectionist models, morphological possession of intentional content is a matter of information being embodied "in the weights." (The tendency to generate occurrent mental states when appropriate is, of course, also something that's "in the weights." So dispositional intentional states can be seen as a special case of morphological content.)
Common sense psychology attributes both occurrent and dispositional modes of possession for the various kinds of state-types it posits, including beliefs and desires. Dispositional beliefs, desires, etc., as such, are unconscious states; any conscious mental state is an occurrent state. On the other hand, common sense psychology does leave open the conceptual possibility of occurrent beliefs and desires that are unconscious. There is no apparent reason why an intentional psychological theory could not posit morphological content, in addition to occurrent and dispositional state types. As far as we can see, morphological content is consistent with common sense psychology, but common sense psychology is not committed to morphological content.2 2.2 Types of Functional Discretenes, and their Status within Common Sense Psychology.
With these distinctions in mind, let us reconsider common sense psychology's commitment to functional discreteness. Consider, for instance, RSG's example of Clouseau. Clouseau has heard that the hotel is closed for the season and that the train is out of service. The Butler says that he spent the night at the hotel and took the train back to town in the morning. Common sense reckons that Clouseau might have inferred that the butler is lying from his belief that the hotel is closed for the season, or from his belief that the morning train has been taken out of service, or from both. From the perspective of common sense there is-often-a determinate answer to the question which it was. RSG believe that no determinate answer to this question is possible if human cognitive systems are relevantly like their Network A.
Why does common sense reckon this a determinate question? The first thought of the common sense psychologist is that it depends upon which relevant beliefs consciously occurred to Clouseau (and which logical connections he was aware of). If he consciously thought of the hotel closing and consciously realized that its being closed meant that the Butler couldn't have spend the evening in the hotel, but didn't remember the train at all at the time, well-its obvious which one was operative.
Consider also RSG's example of Alice the E-mailer. Alice had two reasons to go to her office. She wanted to talk to her research assistant, and believed that he would be at the office. And she wanted to send some E-mail messages, which she believed she could do from the office. "Common sense psychology assumes that Alice's going to her office might have been caused by either one of the belief/desire pairs, or by both, and that determining which of these options obtains is an empirical matter." (p. 505) In RSG's rendition, Alice's desire to send some E-mail messages was causally inert. Why might that be? The most natural explanation is that it did not consciously occur to her in the relevant time frame while her desire to talk to her research assistant did. The relevant time 134 / Terence Horgan and John Tienson frame is not, of course, just the period immediately preceding her departure for the office. She might have had a thought early in the morning which she could have expressed out loud by saying, "Oh, I've got to talk to Fred today about...." She might then have taken care of some household chores, read the paper, gotten ready to go to the office and departed, without Fred ever again entering her consciousness.
Thus, the paradigmatic cases of propositional modularity recognized by common sense psychology are cases in which the causally active mental state is occurrent and conscious, whereas the causally dormant mental state is dispositional but not occurrent. That is, the type of functional discreteness to which common sense psychology is clearly committed is the following.
1. SI is occurrent; S2 is dispositional but not occurrent.
(Subcase: SI conscious/S2 unconscious) (Here and below, SI is the state that is causally active; S2 is a state that could have led to the same action or thought but did not do so in this case.)
We will call this subcase of type 1 functional discreteness paradigmatic functional discreteness.
Common sense also recognizes that one might make use of information that does not rise to consciousness, or arrive at a conclusion without conscious inference, especially in rapid physical activity.3 Thus we should add a second subcase to type 1 functional discreteness: unconscious/unconscious.
It is not contrary to common sense to consider possible complications of paradigmatic functional discreteness, especially in the case of explanation of actions, decisions, choices, etc. Perhaps Alice is more deeply interested in her Email conversations than she cares to admit to herself. So her "real" reason for going to the office is to send some E-mail messages, but she "tells herself' (as we might say) that she is going to the office to talk to Fred. Her desire to send E-mail messages was occurrent and causally efficacious, but she suppressed awareness of its efficacy, and perhaps of the desire itself. This seems to be a case in which both desires are tokened, but in which only one, the one that is not consciously considered, is the actual cause. Thus, common sense clearly recognizes the possibility of a second type of functional discreteness.
2. S1 is occurrent and S2 is occurrent.
(Conscious/conscious; conscious/unconscious; unconscious/conscious; unconscious/unconscious.) All four subcases are conceptually possible although the first is perhaps questionable from the point of view of common sense. It seems odd to suppose that Clouseau thought of the hotel closing, thought of the train being taken out of service, understood that each was incompatible with something the Butler had said, and inferred that the Butler was lying from one of these beliefs but not the other. Dispositional possession of an intentional state-type does not make a direct causal contribution to an outcome the state-type could cause; rather, dispositional states enter the causal fray indirectly via the exercise of the disposition, i.e., via the occurrence during processing of an occurrent token of that state-type. Case 1 involves a situation where the disposition to produce a token of S2 does not get exercised during processing, so it is, in a sense, a degenerate type of functional discreteness. It needs to be stated because it is the one case of functional discreteness to which common sense is clearly committed. Given that intentional state-types that remain merely dispositional do not play a causal role, three further cases are worth distinguishing.
3. SI is occurrent; S2 is morphological.
(Conscious/unconscious; unconscious/unconscious.) 4. SI is morphological; S2 is occurrent.
(Unconscious/conscious; unconscious/unconscious.) 5. SI is morphological; S2 is morphological.
Common sense allows for the conceptual possibility of each of Cases 3 through 5, because one can make intelligible, from the point of view of common sense, the idea that there is morphological content that has a causal role. But it illustrates something more. To infer that the Parkers were home from the raised flag on their mailbox, J must rely on something like (F) the flag is up on the Parkers mailbox only when they are here to raise it. Likewise, when N inferred that the Parkers were home, she relied on something like (D) the Parkers' golden is here only when they are here. Thus, we have instances of (F) and (D) exhibiting functionally discrete causal roles.
But it is quite unlikely that either (F) or (D) consciously occurred to either J or N. And, we submit, it is quite intelligible from the point of view of common sense to suppose that neither (F) nor (D) was tokened subconsciously either; indeed, that neither was tokened subconsciously seems more likely to us than not. If it was not, this is not a case of Type 1 or of Type 2 functional discreteness. If the information (F) that played a role in J's inference was not tokened consciously or unconsciously, then it was morphological rather than occurrent or merely dispositional.4 This seems, then, to be construable by common sense as a case of Type 5 functional discreteness. So common sense evidently does permit the possibility of morphological content and Type 5 functional discreteness. (In Section 5 we offer an example construable as Type 4 functional discreteness, plus variants of RSG's Clouseau example for each of Types 2-5.)
But our main point in this Section is that common sense is only committed to the paradigm case of functional discreteness, Type 1 functional discreteness where the causally active state is conscious. The other cases we have distinguished are recognized by common sense as possibilities, some as the quite serious possibilities.
In Section 2.5 below, we argue that all five types of functional discreteness are possible in models that fall within the class of models characterized by RSG. The most immediate reply to RSG's functional discreteness argument is now quite straightforward. The only kind of functional discreteness to which common sense psychology is committed is paradigmatic functional discreteness. Connectionist models have no trouble at all manifesting this degenerate kind of functional discreteness. For, on one hand, the occurrent beliefs of common sense psychology correspond most naturally to certain tokened activation patterns in a connectionist network; and activation patterns have a causal influence on processing. Processing in a connectionist network is spreading activation. On the other hand, the dispositional beliefs of common sense psychology correspond most naturally to a connectionist network's dispositions to generate the activation patterns that function in the system as representation-tokens; and when such a disposition remains dormant, so that the relevant activation pattern does not get tokened during processing, then the pattern does not affect the system's processing (since it is not there). Thus, paradigmatic functional discreteness is easily accommodated within the relevant class of connectionist models: an activation pattern can occur that constitutes a token representation that causes a certain subsequent outcome, while at the same time the system has a dispositional representation which would bring about the same outcome were it activated and yet remains dormant on this particular occasion. Therefore, the connectionist models considered by RSG do not preclude the kind of functional discreteness to which common sense psychology is committed.
In the remainder of this subsection we will amplify this reply, by discussing (i) the Network A described by RSG and their remarks about it, (ii) RSG's replies to certain objections they themselves consider, and (iii) recent remarks about RSG's modularity argument by Stich and Warfield (forthcoming) .
There are two kinds of representations in Network A. The input layer is interpreted as representing questions concerning the truth or falsity of certain propositions. And the trained up network represents answers to those questions. That is, it represents certain propositions as being true or false in the pattern of activation in the set of nodes consisting of input nodes plus the output node.
Activation of the encoding of a proposition in the input layer causes the output node to record true or false. The occurrent representation of the proposition causes the recollection of its truth value. Potential but non-occurrent representations do not exert any such influence. Thus Network A, like connectionist models generally, exhibits paradigmatic functional discreteness: occurrent representations have an effect, whereas non-occurrent representations that the system is disposed to produce, but has not produced on a given occasion, do not have an effect.
Of course, what RSG actually have in mind as analogues of beliefs, in Network A, are not occurrent representations in the input layer (or in the hidden layer), but rather the propositional information which is holistically embodied "in the weights". They argue, Since information is encoded in a highly distributed manner...with information regarding any given proposition scattered throughout the network, the system lacks functionally discrete, identifiable sub-structures that are semantically interpretable as representations of individual propositions. (514.)5
Functional discreteness does not obtain, they contend, for propositional information embodied holistically in the network's weights (and biases). Ratier, There is a real sense in which all the information encoded in the network's connectivity matrix [weights] is causally implicated in any processing in which the network engages. (O'Brien, 1991, p. 173 ; quoted with endorsement by Stich, 1991, p. 180)6 But the common-sense psychologist can grant that all the information in the weights is implicated in any processing in which the network engages, and deny that this goes contrary to the kind of functional discreteness to which common sense psychology is committed (viz., the paradigmatic kind). Information in the weights is, if anything, the connectionist analog of morphological content. And common sense psychology simply is not committed to claiming that morphological content in humans exhibits functional discreteness. Whether it does or not is an open empirical question, as far as common sense psychology is concerned. Thus, if (some) distributed connectionist models do not have functionally discrete morphological content, that doesn't make them incompatible with common sense psychology; rather, it answers the empirical question negatively (for those models).
RSG do discuss the objection that (i) connectionist representations are patterns of activation, and (ii) activation patterns are functionally discrete states. They reply that the identification of beliefs with activation patterns is "singularly implausible," because "in common sense psychology beliefs and propositional memories are typically of substantial duration; and they are the sorts of things that cognitive agents generally have lots of even when they are not using them" (p. 518). But the appropriate counterreply is straightforward: it is only occurrent beliefs that are appropriately regarded, within connectionist modeling, as activation patterns.
RSG also discuss the suggestion that "long standing beliefs might be identified not with activation patterns, but with dispositions to produce activation patterns," and the related suggestion that "the familiar philosophical distinction between dispositional and occurrent beliefs might be captured, in connectionist models, as the distinction between dispositions to produce activation patterns and activation patterns themselves" (pp. 518-9). They reply that dispositions to produce activation patterns "are not the discrete, independently causally active states that folk psychology requires" (p. 519). Once again the counterreply is straightforward: folk psychology recognizes a distinction between occurrent and dispositional belief, and is not committed to the functional discreteness of dispositional beliefs qua dispositional; it is only committed to paradigmatic functional discreteness. (Dispositions to re-create beliefs, memories, etc. are in the weights holistically. But the (recreatable) activation pattern is not in the weights when it is not active. It is nowhere. Thus, there really is no question of the functional discreteness of dispositional beliefs. It is not that all of the dispositional beliefs are directly implicated in processing; none of them are.7)
So connectionist representations have, by and large, functionally discrete causal roles. Those representations that get activated in a process play a causal role in that process; those not activated do not. And the specific causal roles of the ones that get activated depend upon patterns of spreading activation.8
Stich and Warfield (forthcoming) reply to a similar observation by Andy Clark (1990). Clark suggests that it is only a "belief-in-action" (as opposed to a long-standing belief, which may be just a disposition to produce an occurrent belief-in-action) that needs to be capable of functionally discrete causal potency (p. 96). Stich and Warfield's relevant argument is that the proposal is too weak, for on the interpretation of propositional modularity..., no deterministic system that stores propositional information could fail to satisfy propositional modularity. If this is right, there is nothing at all we could learn about the workings of such a system that would show that it violates modularity and thus does not really have beliefs. (Section 2.2)
We take 'and thus' in the last line to mean 'and for this [lack of propositional modularity] reason'. Other deep commitments of common sense psychology might be violated even if propositional modularity is not.
Thus, the operative complaint in this passage is that, on the proposed interpretation of propositional modularity (which requires discrete causal potency only for tokened representations), no system could fail to satisfy propositional modularity, in particular, no system could fail to exhibit functional discreteness.
Our reply is fourfold. First, Network A is a model of a single, immediate cognitive step-in this case, rote recall. There are no representation-level intermediaries. Given that the input and output of such a one-step process are (interpreted as) representations, and that representations are entered singly, nothing could show that the system lacks Type 1 functional discreteness. The occurrent representation in the input layer is causally active. Dispositional representations-ones that could be in the input layer but are not-are not causally active.
But second, this is surely nothing to complain about. Any cognitive process which is immediate for a system,9 and which receives only one relevant input at a time must, obviously, exhibit Type 1 functional discreteness. (It does not even depend upon the system being deterministic.) This just means that the commitment of common sense psychology to functional discreteness of propositional attitudes is a very weak commitment.
However, third, it is easy to imagine other sorts of connectionist models that might not exhibit functional discreteness for tokened representations. A model of some task that involves multiple simultaneous soft constraint satisfaction, for instance, must allow many representations to be active at once. It might often, perhaps even typically, be impossible to determine which representations were causally responsible for the solution to a problem, especially if the representations are widely distributed. Furthermore, some systems with distributed representations in which each node contributes to many different representations can have many representations active at once by superposition of representations, in which case it may be-though it need not be (cf. section 2.5 below)-impossible to separate the causal contribution of distinct representations. Thus, there may be models of these kinds, with sensible representation level interpretations that do not exhibit Type 2 functional discreteness.
Finally, fourth, common sense psychology is not committed to Type 2 functional discreteness anyway. The only kind of functional discreteness to which it is actually committed is trivially satisfiable. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we are wrong in claiming that common sense psychology is only committed to the kind of functional discreteness that involves a conscious occurrent belief and a non-activated dispositional belief, and that it is actually committed to some or all of the other kinds delineated in section 2.1 above. Suppose too (although we will argue against this in the next subsection) that distributed connectionist models of the sort sketched by RSG are incompatible with the further kinds of functional modularity. Do these suppositions sanction RSG's key claim, viz., "If connectionist hypotheses of the sort we will sketch turn out to be right, so too will eliminativism about propositional attitudes" (p. 500)?
Surely not. RSG themselves draw a distinction between "ontologically conservative" theory changes (which preserve the key theoretical entities posited by of an original theory while altering or replacing that theory's claims about those entities), and "ontologically radical" theory changes (in which the entities posited by the old theory are repudiated as well). Even if common sense psychology happens to be committed to one or more kinds of functional discreteness of Type 2 through Type 5, altering the theory by dropping this commitment would be a rather conservative change-especially since these are not paradigmatic cases of functional discreteness. Such a change would not even approach entailing that there are no beliefs.'0 2.5 Third Reply: Strong Forms of Functional Discreteness Are Not Precluded.
Distributed connectionist models embody information holistically, rather than containing discrete items of propositional information in physically discrete internal states, structures, or processes. Information that is not occurrently represented is distributed throughout the network, and each part of the network contributes to storing much or all of its information. So it appears plausible that distributed connectionist models are incompatible with functional discreteness of Types 3-5. This appearance motivates RSG's argument. But the appearance is misleading, as we now briefly explain. We begin by describing a way of thinking about morphological content in connectionism. We then discuss a common phenomenon that is plausibly regarded as involving Type 4 functional discreteness-that is, a situation in which morphological content trumps occurrent content. Then we revisit Clouseau and the butler.
The natural mathematical framework for describing connectionist networks is the body of mathematical concepts, techniques, and results known as dynamical systems theory. To describe a network as a dynamical system is to specify in a certain way its temporal evolution, both actual and hypothetical. Each node in the network is assigned a separate dimension, or axis, in a high-dimensional hyper-space; the possible activation values the node can take are points along that axis. Each possible total state of the system is thus represented by a unique point in the system's "state space" (in the case of connectionist networks, often called "activation space"). The dynamical system, as such, is essentially the full collection of temporal trajectories the network would follow through its state space-with a trajectory emanating from each point it can occupy in state space.
The dynamical system can be thought of as a high-dimensional geometrical/topological object. A useful geometrical metaphor for dynamical systems is the notion of a landscape (in the case of networks, an activation landscape). Think of the network's n-dimensional activation space as a contoured ndimensional surface, oriented "horizontally" in (n+1)-dimensional space. For each point p, the temporal trajectory that the network itself would follow through its activation space if it were to evolve (without perturbation) from p is the path "downhill" along the landscape that a ball would follow if positioned at p and then allowed to "roll."
Each point on the activation landscape corresponds to a total activation state of the network. Certain of these points are representation-realizing points: when the network is in the total activation state corresponding to the given point, one or more representations are tokened as activation patterns. In general, representations are multiply realizable in connectionist models. Representations are identified with activation vectors, typically with activation vectors that specify activation values for only a relatively small portion of the nodes of the network. Such a vector thus specifies values for some, but not all dimensions of activation space. All points that satisfy these values will realize the given representation." Also, several distinct representations can, in general, be realized by a single point in activation space: the point's coordinates simultaneously satisfying the coordinate-specifications of several different vectors, each of which is identified with a distinct representation.'2 From the dynamical systems point of view, cognitive-level state transitions in a connectionist network are trajectories along the activation landscape from one representation-realizing point to another. These transitions depend jointly on two interrelated factors: (i) the relative positions on the activation landscape of the representation-realizing points, and (ii) the topography of the landscape itself. Landscape topography is determined by the connections among the nodes and the weights on those nodes. "Training up" a network, by progressively altering its weights in accordance with some learning algorithm (e.g., backpropagation of error), amounts to the progressive molding of the activation landscape in a way that results in systematically content-appropriate trajectories from one representation-realizing point to another.'3 Learning thus involves modification of the existing activation landscape, in a way that accommodates new information while leaving intact the information to which what is learned is irrelevant.
Learning to make a certain class of inferences, for instance, produces a slope or incline on the activation landscape. From every point realizing a (possibly complex) representation of a certain kind, the system is inclined to proceed to a point realizing a corresponding representation of a different kind. The landscape also has other inclines, subserving potentially conflicting inferences one has learned to make. And many other inclines too, subserving various potentially conflicting tendencies to evolve from one representational point to another in various non-inferential content-appropriate ways. So the activation landscape is a very high dimensional, subtly contoured, space with inclines upon inclines upon inclines. (Think of the disorientation and contortion of earlier geological strata by rising new land.) Thus, being inclined to make an inference does not mean that one will make the inference.
In any particular cognitive trajectory along the activation landscape, information that is part of the content of representation-realizing points along that trajectory is the information that becomes occurrent-i.e., gets explicitly represented-during the cognitive process corresponding to that trajectory. On the other hand, information that is accommodated by the trajectory without being part of the content of any representation-realizing point on it is (relative to that trajectory, anyway) morphologically embodied rather than explicitly represented. The local topographical features of the landscape-i.e., the various different, superimposed inclines present in the immediate vicinity of a given representationrealizing point-are what determine the content-appropriate trajectory from any such point to another one.
One special case of inclines in activation space comes up fairly often in connectionist discussions. Representations are thought of as attractor points or regions in activation space, and one speaks of the basin of the attractor-viz, the set of all points in activation space from which the system will evolve to the attractor. A basin is, of course, an incline all individual slopes of which lead to the same place.
For a different kind of example of an incline, consider a system that has learned to make a class of Humean inferences. Whenever it encounters an A, it expects a B. But it has never occurrently represented the proposition that A's are B's, and it is not currently disposed to do so. Perhaps if it is sophisticated enough, it could come to occurrently believe that A's are B's by reflecting on its own inferential tendencies. But it has not reflected in that way.
In such a case, the information that A's are B's is contained in the system morphologically (but not dispositionally or occurrently). That is, there is an incline in its activation space connecting A-realizing points to B-realizing points, but there is no point in its current activation space that realizes the belief that A's are B's.
Consider now the phenomenon of prejudice. A person is strongly inclined to come to certain kinds ofjudgments, J, about anyone (or anything) he classifies as being of a certain type, K.14 On occasion he feels a need to explain one of those judgments, sometimes from external prodding, sometimes not. On these occasions he comes up with an explanation of the particular judgment that does not refer to type K. And typically, the explanations he gives are rather different in different cases.
The prejudice consists in an incline in that person's activation space from points realizing representations of individuals as being of kind K to points realizing Jjudgments about those individuals. The person may have little or no inclination to (occurrently) believe the generalization connecting K to J. (Being a human being, he has, of course, the capacity to entertain that generalization.)
Often when a Jjudgment is made, it is preceded by an occurrent representation, R, that the person puts forward-to himself or others-as the reason for his Jjudgment on a particular occasion. But in fact, R is causally inert. There is no path in activation space from points realizing R but not realizing a representation of an individual as of kind K to the J judgment. At the network level, there is no spreading of activation from R to J.
The incline (in activation space), i.e., morphological content, plays an actual causal role in bringing about the J judgment; the occurrent representation, R, does not. Thus, we have here a conceptually possible case of Type 4 functional discreteness. Representation R might be a complex representation that fully justifies J-in the easiest case, the premises of a valid argument for J. Yet K leads to J only in conjunction with the (mis)information morphologically embodied in the incline from K-realizing points to J-realizing points; and K leads to J in that case whether or not the inferential trajectory commences from an Rrealizing point. Furthermore, the person need not consciously represent the fact that the individual is of kind K for his prejudice concerning K's to come into play. (It is an interesting empirical question whether such a representation must be occurrent at all, even unconsciously.)
Consider, in light of the foregoing discussion, RSG's example of Clouseau. Suppose that Clouseau's internal network is at a point p in activation space that realizes the state-type B: (B) believing that the butler said he spent the night at the village hotel, and that he said he arrived back on the morning train.
Suppose that Clouseau's activation landscape has distinct, determinate, inclines within it that respectively subserve trajectories appropriate to belief-types H and T, respectively:
(H) believing that the village hotel is closed for the season. (T) believing that the morning train has been taken out of service.
(We will call these inclines the H-incline and the T-incline, respectively.) In the immediate vicinity of the point p on Clouseau's activation landscape that his cognitive system currently occupies, the local topography is a complex contouring consisting of the superposition of various different inclines, including the Hincline and the T-incline. Suppose that at point p, the T-incline and certain other inclines (not including the H-incline) effectively "cancel each other out"; i.e., when superimposed together, the T-incline and these other inclines jointly make no net contribution to the local topography in the vicinity of p. Finally, suppose that the dominant net effect, locally at point p, is contributed by the H-incline. So an inferential trajectory commences, emanating from p and terminating at a point p' which realizes the state-type L:
(L) believing that the butler is lying. This is a scenario in which Clouseau believes that the village hotel is closed for the season, he also believes that the morning train has been take out of service, and he infers that the butler is lying on the basis of the first belief but not the second. This scenario can be further elaborated in several ways, corresponding to Type 2 through Type 5 functional discreteness. If the content of both belief H and belief T is only embodied morphologically in the H-incline and T-incline 144 / Terence Horgan and John Tienson respectively, but neither content gets occurrently represented during Clouseau's inferential process, then we get morphological/morphological functional discreteness: Type 5. But there are three other variants or the scenario, where the content of one or both beliefs also becomes occurrent, i.e., is part of the representational content of point p, or of some other point along the inferential trajectory commencing from p: H and T both occurrent (Type 2); H occurrent but not T (Type 3); T occurrent but not H (Type 4).
So the upshot of this subsection is that all four of these kinds of functional discreteness are open conceptual possibilities, under distributed connectionism. RSG are mistaken to suppose that functional discreteness of cognitive states can only occur if the content of those states is embodied, in weights and/or in activation patterns, in a physically discrete way.'5 3. The Projectable Predicates Argument.
RSG briefly offer a second argument for the radical incompatibility of connectionism and common sense psychology. Network A learned the truth values of sixteen propositions. RSG describe a second model, Network B, which learned the truth values of those sixteen propositions plus one more. The weights, biases, and internal activation values in processing are not similar in Networks A and B, and the differences between them do not correlate in any way with the difference in what they have "learned". Both of these networks represent the proposition that dogs have fur, among others. There are indefinitely many other connectionist networks that represent the information that dogs have fur, which differ in indefinitely many ways from Networks A and B.
From these observations, RSG argue as follows.
...common sense psychology treats predicates expressing the semantic properties of propositional attitudes as projectable. Thus 'believes that dogs have fur' or 'remembers that dogs have fur' will be projectable predicates in common sense psychology.... [But] though there are indefinitely many connectionist networks that represent the information that dogs have fur just as well as Network A does, these networks have no projectable features in common that are describable in the language of connectionist theory. (514) Thus, we take it, the conclusion is that common sense psychology treats as projectable a huge class of predicates that connectionism renders non-projectable.
(Projectable predicates, say RSG, are "the sort of predicates that are appropriately used in nomological or law-like generalizations" (p. 504).) Hence, if connectionism turns out to be correct, there will be no states of the kind that these common-sense psychological predicates purport to ascribe.'6 RSG profess not to find "features in common that are describable in connectionist theory" in Networks A and B. We suppose that they are thinking of connectionist theory as the theory of networks: activation levels and the equations that determine them, weights, biases, and learning algorithms. There are indeed no projectable predicates here that correspond to the projectable predicates of common sense psychology.
But the projectable predicates of common sense psychology are "predicates expressing the semantic properties of propositional attitudes." Connectionist theory also has predicates expressing the semantic properties of representationse.g., the predicate, 'representation that dogs have fur.' A large part of connectionist theorizing consists of talk about representations. Read the description of any connectionist model! Read RSG's description of Network A! Prominent in the description of any connectionist model is an account of the representations in the model and of how they are realized in the network. The connectionist models on which RSG's argument centers are, they insist, to be construed as cognitive models. Surely, if a model is construed as a cognitive model, then representations will be a central part of the theory of that model.
Thus, Network A and Network B do have a feature in common that is describable in the language of connectionist theory: they both represent the proposition that dogs have fur. And, of course, they share this feature with all those other actual and potential connectionist models that have a representation of the proposition that dogs have fur.
Furthermore, connectionist representation predicates are projectable. For any reasonably successful connectionist model that has a representation of the proposition that dogs have fur, 'representation that dogs have fur' will be a projectable predicate. If the alleged representations of a model are not projectable relative to the cognitive task being modeled, the model doesn't work. Exactly how representation predicates are projectable relative to a model will depend upon the cognitive task being modeled. But that is what one would expect, since cognitive models tend to be aimed at modeling a single cognitive task or small cluster of tasks, and the causal role of a representation relative to one cognitive task will be different from its causal role relative to different cognitive tasks. '7 When the same network is trained up on the same task more than once, there are differences in weights, biases, and activation levels of hidden nodes, but generalizations involving representation-level connectionist predicates are typically projectable from one trained up network to the other. Representation-level generalizations are similarly projectable when distinct networks are implementations of the same cognitive model, and when similar networks are trained up on different but similar tasks (as were RSG's Network A and Network B).
Generalizations involving representation-level connectionist predicates are not, in general, projectable from one connectionist model to others devoted to different cognitive tasks; the terms of such a generalization are often not even applicable to the other model. But that is a result of the nature of cognitive modeling. In any case, it is not a difference from common sense. From the point of view of common sense psychology, the degree of projectability of generalizations involving propositional attitude predicates to other cognizers and other 146 / Terence Horgan and John Tienson kinds of cognizers is quite variable and context dependent. Thus, connectionism has projectable predicates-predicates assigning representations to network models-that line up quite nicely with the projectable predicates of common sense psychology.
When RSG say "these networks have no projectable features in common" (our emphasis), there is a sense in which what they say is true. The networks as such have no projectable features in common. The models-the networks interpreted as performing a cognitive task-do have projectable features in common. Cognitive science is a branch of scientific theory that spans and interconnects several levels of description. Within classical, pre-connectionist, cognitive science, the canonical articulation of the multi-level nature of the enterprise was given by David Marr, who wrote:
At one extreme, the top level, is the abstract computational theory of the device, in which the performance of the device is characterized as a mapping from one kind of information to another, the abstract properties of this mapping are defined precisely, and its appropriateness and adequacy for the task are demonstrated. In the center is the choice of representation for the input and output and algorithm to transform one into the other. At the other extreme are the details of how the algorithm and representation are realized physically-the detailed computer architecture, so to speak. (1982, (24) (25) Thus, Marr identifies three theoretically significant levels of description. The top level, the level of the mental qua mental, specifies a cognitive function: a transition-function that pairs cognitive states with the appropriate cognitive successorstates.'8 The middle level specifies the algorithm by which that function is computed. And the lowest level specifies the physical device in which the algorithm is implemented.'9 An algorithm, or program, is a mathematical object, a set of rules for manipulating symbols or data-structures purely on the basis of their formal/structural properties, independent of any intentional content they might have. Symbols and data-structures, so described, are also mathematical objects. Thus, the middle level in Marr's typology is a mathematical level of organization. This level of organization mediates between intentional mental states and their physical realization. Intentional mental states and state-transitions are realized by certain mathematical states and state-transitions, which in turn are realized by certain physical states and state-transitions.20 The mathematical level is the appropriate one for characterizing the abstract system of functional/organizational features that constitutes Nature's engineering design for human cognition.
However, the discrete mathematics of algorithms is not common to all approaches to cognition. As discussed in Section 2.5, the natural mathematical framework for connectionism is the theory of dynamical systems. And if cognitive transitions are not determined by algorithms over symbols, then it need not be assumed that the potential cognitive transitions of a cognitive system consti-tute a tractably computable function. Marr's tri-level typology for cognitive science can thus be seen as a species of a more generic tri-level typology:
Cognitive State-Transitions. The level of the mental qua mental. Mathematical State-Transitions. The level of functional organization. Physical Implementation. The level of the physical qua physical.
Connectionist cognitive models are another species of this generic typology, with the mathematics of dynamical systems as the natural mathematical framework at the middle level of description, and with connectionist networks (often as simulated on conventional computers) as the prototypical devices for physical implementation.2"
In both classical and connectionist cognitive science, then, theorizing involves the cognitive, the mathematical, and the physical levels of description and the interconnections among them. In both classical and connectionist cognitive science, predicates at each level of description are projectable, even though the state-types they express are multiply realizable at lower levels of description.22 To claim, as RSG do, that connectionist models that differ in the manner of their Network A and Network B "have no projectable features in common that are describable in the language of connectionist theory," is to ignore the fact that connectionist cognitive science includes two levels of description above the level of the physical qua physical.
Conclusion.
RSG argue that common sense psychology is incompatible with a certain brand of connectionism because common sense psychology is committed to the functional discreteness of propositional attitudes, while that brand of connectionism precludes functional discreteness. We distinguished three ways in which a cognitive system may possess intentional content: occurrently, dispositionally, or morphologically. Mixing and matching these ways of possessing content leads to several conceptually possible types of functional discreteness. We argued that common sense psychology is committed to only the most innocuous kind of functional discreteness-Type 1 functional discreteness, in which occurrent representations make a causal contribution and merely dispositional ones do not. Virtually any system that has representations, including the systems of RSG's brand of connectionism, will exhibit Type 1 functional discreteness.
Common sense also recognizes the possibility of the other types of functional discreteness that we distinguish, and some of these possibilities suggest interesting ways to think about cognition. We suggested (in Section 2.5) that these other types of functional discreteness could be found in distributed connectionist models. Thus, even if common sense psychology is more deeply committed to functional discreteness than we believe, RSG would not have shown that common sense psychology is incompatible with distributed 148 / Terence Horgan and John Tienson connectionism.
We also argued (Section 3), contrary to RSG, that connectionist theory does have projectable predicates comparable to the propositional attitude predicates of common sense psychology.
Even if we have succeeded in showing that RSG's arguments are not successful, this constitutes only a limited defense of the compatibility of connectionism and common sense psychology. There are other arguments afoot (e.g., Davies 1991 ) that purport to demonstrate an incompatibility between connectionism and common sense." But addressing such arguments and the issues they raise is a task for another occasion. Notes 1. The paper has been anthologized at least four times (see the entry for it in the bibliography), and has been widely discussed in the recent philosophical literature. 2. We leave open the question of what sorts of conditions must be met by morphological content in order for it to count as the morphological possession of a belief (or of some other state-type of common sense psychology). Here is one plausible-looking requirement: in order to be a belief, the state-type must be one that can become an occurent thought within the cognitive system. Morphological content only counts as a belief if that content is also possessed dispositionally. 3. Whether arriving at a conclusion without conscious inference is properly called inference at all from the point of view of common sense is not clear. But it does not matter for present purposes. 4. This sort of thing-non-tokened information playing an essential role in cognitive processing-appears to be ubiquitous. If it really does occur, as the phenomenology of conscious experience suggests, then any adequate theory of cognition needs to be able to account for it. 5. This argument as stated is clearly fallacious. It has the same logical form as: since there are non-cows in the pasture, there are no cows in the pasture. (Since network A has states that embody propositional information indiscretely, it lacks states that embody propositional information discretely.) But what RSG obviously mean is that the propositional information embodied in the system's weights is not embodied by functionally discrete substructures of weighted connections. 6. O'Brien says here that the information is encoded in the network's connectivity matrix, and this is not an uncommon way to speak. We would choose, however, not to say that the weights themselves encode information, though they may be said to embody (RSG's word) information. Information is not represented in the weights; it's represented in the representations. The weights do not constitute a code. 7. In traditional, pre-connectionist, models of memory in cognitive science, memories are full-fledged representations; they reside in a mental "file cabinet," in the same form as when they become occurrent by being fetched back into the system's central processing unit. But the idea of stored (in-the-head, or in-the-soul) memories is not presupposed by common sense psychology (even though if it might seem so to some philosophers educated in classical cognitive science). Common sense is not committed to any particular view about the ontology of memory; hence it is not contrary to common sense to say that beliefs and memories are no where when not active. Cf. Locke: "Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases to revive Perceptions... . And in this Sense it is, that our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again.... (Essay, II.X.ii.) 8. There are many ways in which activated representations might be involved in a process. Some might, for example, be false starts that are overruled by further information or processing. But in such cases it is often possible, by following out paths of spreading activation, to determine which active representations made a positive casual contribution in bringing about the end result, and which active representations got overruled. 9. A particular type of cognitive transition might be traversed in several cognitive steps by one connectionist system but leapt in a single bound by another. Cf. Lloyd 1991. 10. Stich and Warfield (forthcoming) make essentially the same point (without, however, distinguishing between paradigmatic functional discreteness and the other kinds). Needless to say, this is a change of position for Stich. 11. A more familiar source of multiple realizability in connectionist models is that often many different vectors-all vectors meeting some condition-count as realizing the same representation. E.g., the representation is considered activated when all members of a certain set of nodes have activation level > .85. 12. Sometimes when two or more distinct representations are realized by a single point on the activation landscape, each occurrent representation will correspond to a physically discrete sub-pattern of activation within the overall activation state of the network; but sometimes the total complex representation will instead be a physical superposition of physical sub-patterns, with certain nodes participating simultaneously in several sub-patterns. (In Bach's piano music, often a note played on a single key belongs simultaneously to several superimposed, contrapuntal, melodies.) 13. Certain sophisticated learning techniques employ what is called the "moving target" strategy, which in effect brings about a controlled co-evolution of weights and representations; in dynamical systems terms, this amounts to the simultaneous molding of the activation landscape and re-positioning of representational points on that landscape. We discuss specific examples in Horgan and Tienson (1992a, 1993 ). 14. The term 'prejudice' has negative associations. But there are prejudices that incline one to make positive judgments, as well as evaluatively neutral judgments. 15. Forster and Saidel (forthcoming) present a simple network that arguably exhibits some of the kinds of functional discreteness we have been describing (and also illustrates some of the ways that functional discreteness is related to various counterfactual conditionals true of the network's performance). 16. RSG state the alleged connectionism/common sense contrast in another way:
From the point of view of the connectionist model builder, the class of networks that might model a cognitive agent who believes that dogs have fur is not a genuine kind at all, but simply a chaotically disjunctive set. Common sense psychology treats the class of people who believe that dogs have fur as a psychologically natural kind; connectionism does not. This suggests a rhetorically stronger eliminativist conclusion: if connectionism is correct, then certain natural kinds of common sense psychology do not exist (though it seems odd to say that common sense psychology treats the class of people who believe that dogs have fur, as opposed to the belief itself, as a natural kind). We will discuss the argument in terms of projectable predicates, although what we say applies equally to natural kinds. 17. Most any connectionist cognitive model will exhibit certain non-accidental generalizations at the representational level of description. For instance, in Chapter 1 of Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) , one finds the following remarks about a model of memory retrieval that embodies information about the members of two gangs, the Sharks and the Jets:
The model...tends to retrieve what is common to those memories which match a retrieval cue which is too general to capture any one memory.... In this way the model can retrieve the typical values that members of the Jets has on each dimension-even though no one Jet has these typical values. (p. 30) 18. Marr labels the top level 'the theory of the computation'. This refers to what is to be computed. How it is computed is to be determined at the middle level. 19. In general, the interconnections between these three levels involve a variable number of intervening levels. Flow charts specify levels of description between the top and the middle-increasingly specific determinations of the algorithm by which the cognitive function is computed. There may be several levels between an Al program in a familiar programming language-Marr's middle level-and the machine language of the computer on which it is running-which is not yet a physical implementation, but rather is the abstract specification of the computational processes that literally get physically implemented. The specification of a network, including weights and activation equations and levels, occupies a similar role in connectionism. 20. Multiple realizability is possible between each level and one below it. This point is commonly recognized with respect to the physical realization of computational processes, but it is equally true for the computational realization of intentional statetransitions. For further elaboration of this point, see Horgan (1992, pp.454-6) and Horgan and Tienson (1993, pp. 160 ). On p. 162 of the latter we quote a passage from Marr (1977) indicating that he himself evidently appreciated the point quite clearly. 21. This generic framework and the possible virtues of its connectionist species are discussed in detail in Horgan and Tienson (1994, forthcoming a) . 22. For a discussion of multiple realizability of higher-level states and processes in connectionist models, see Bickle (in preparation). 23. Davies argues (i) that common sense psychology requires a language of thought, in order to accommodate the distinctive causal roles that common sense posits for semantic constituents of propositional attitudes, but (ii) that connectionism with distributed representations is incompatible with a language of thought. We agree with Davies that syntax is necessary to support the kind of causal role of semantic constituents that common sense psychology implies. But we maintain that connectionism does not preclude either syntactic structure in mental representations or structure-sensitive processing; nor does it become mere implementation of classicism by incorporating these features. Cf. Horgan and Tienson (1988 , 1989 , 1992a , 1992b , forthcoming a, forthcoming b).
